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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/6440


    Title: 管理授權與品質選擇下數量與價格競爭模型之等同性研究
    Authors: 王雅津
    王鳳生
    王聖凱
    蕭宇幀
    Keywords: 等同性
    合作係數
    授權賽局
    品質競爭
    coefficient of co-operation
    equivalence outcome
    delegation games
    quality competition
    Date: 2007-07-31
    Issue Date: 2009-12-30 14:08:57 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本模型建構在垂直產品差異的雙占空間經濟中,企業所有人的品質投資決策、授權決策及經理人的市場競爭決策構成了三階段賽局。授權契約的加權是採用合作係數模型,以自己的利潤加權對手的利潤作為組合。研究結果發現,高品質廠商及低品質廠商在授權的運作下,不論是採取數量決策或價格決策,均衡價格、產量、品質及利潤皆具有等同性;其同時反應出品質投資水準與廠商的競爭模式無關。與文獻最大的不同在於垂直產品差異模型下,雙占廠商的競爭並非對稱的,因此高、低品質廠商的授權係數是有所差異的,當某一廠商採取價格決策時,另一廠商就有必要採取激勵性的授權方式;當某一廠商採取數量決策時,另一廠商則不會以激勵性的授權作為對策。更重要的是,高品質廠商較低品質廠商具有策略之優勢。
    In a three-stage vertical differentiated-products duopoly model, profit-maximizing owner first choose quality, and then incentive schemes in order to influence their managers’ behavior. In the third stage, basing the manager’s objective function on a linear combination of the firm’s profit and its rival’s profit, the managers compete either both in quantities, both in prices, or one in quantity and the other in price. If the owners have sufficient power to manipulate their managers’ incentives, the equilibrium outcome is the same regardless of how the firms compete in the market. If equivalence outcome holds, the equilibrium qualities do not depend on the mode of product-market competition. In the delegation game when one firm competes by setting price, the other firms will positive weight on coefficient of co-operation. Conversely, when one firm competes in quantity, the equilibrium incentive scheme puts negative weight or no delegation on coefficient of co-operation. In contrast with the existing literature in this area, two important differences are (i) coefficient of co-operation are different between high quality firm and low quality firm because of asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and (ii) high-quality firm have the strategic advantage even though the firms move simultaneously at all the stages.
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 研究計畫

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