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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/6322

    Title: 寡占市場競爭下策略授權、垂直結構與貿易政策之主題研究
    Authors: 王雅津
    Keywords: 垂直外部性
    Vertical Externality
    Mark-share Delegation
    Sales Delegation
    Timing Order
    Input Pticing
    Date: 2008-07-31
    Issue Date: 2009-12-30 09:48:14 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究在垂直相關產業中探討不同策略授權及決策順序對於要素訂價的影響。主要結果發現: (i)當下游廠商先決定管理授權契約時, 其授權型式並不會影響最終產品市場的Cournot競爭均衡; (ii)要素單價不受管理授權型式及決策順序所影響; (iii)上游獨占廠商先宣告要素價格可取得較高的利潤, 下游廠商則會採取市場份額授權策略因應。上游獨占廠商掠奪利潤時,由於下游雙占廠商面對「囚犯困境」下的決策,反而降低了垂直分離產業結構下的負面垂直外部性。
    In this project, we examine how different delegation contracts and the timing order of the game affect the input pricing in a vertically-related industry. The major findings are that: (i) the downstream firm’s owners obtain the same profit as in the simple Nash equilibrium regardless of delegation forms in a delegation-input price-output competition game; (ii) input pricing is irrelevant of delegation forms and the order of firms moves; and (iii) the upstream monopolist will make price announcement to catch more profit, while downstream firms will react with market-share delegation. The opportunistic behaviors of the upstream monopolist contrarily results in a lessening of vertical externality in a vertically separated industry because a prisoner’s dilemma exists for downstream firms in product market.
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 研究計畫

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