Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibriumwith sector-specific unemployment

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Title:	Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibriumwith sector-specific unemployment
Authors:	王雅津(Ya-Chin Wang) Leonard F. S. Wang Lihong Zhao
Keywords:	Managerial delegation Unemployment General equilibrium
Date:	2009
Issue Date:	2009-11-15 02:25:46 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper explores the effects of managerial delegation in a generalequilibrium, oligopolistic competition model with sector-specific unemployment. It specifically examines the effects of managerial delegation on outputs, factor returns and the urban unemployment ratio. It is found that if the managerial firm is less profit-oriented, managerial delegation can lead to an increase in the urban output, a decrease in the rural output, an increase in the capital rental and a decrease in the rural wage. In particular, it worsens the urban unemployment ratio.
Relation:	International Review of Economics
Appears in Collections:	[金融管理系] 期刊論文

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