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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/5652

    Title: Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibriumwith sector-specific unemployment
    Authors: 王雅津(Ya-Chin Wang)
    Leonard F. S. Wang
    Lihong Zhao
    Keywords: Managerial delegation
    General equilibrium
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2009-11-15 02:25:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper explores the effects of managerial delegation in a generalequilibrium,
    oligopolistic competition model with sector-specific unemployment. It
    specifically examines the effects of managerial delegation on outputs, factor returns
    and the urban unemployment ratio. It is found that if the managerial firm is less
    profit-oriented, managerial delegation can lead to an increase in the urban output, a
    decrease in the rural output, an increase in the capital rental and a decrease in the
    rural wage. In particular, it worsens the urban unemployment ratio.
    Relation: International Review of Economics
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 期刊論文

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