Equivalence of Competition Mode in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Delegation: a note

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Title:	Equivalence of Competition Mode in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Delegation: a note
Authors:	王雅津(Ya-Chin Wang) Leonard F.S. Wang
Keywords:	Relative performance contract equivalence outcome delegation games quality competition
Date:	2009-12
Issue Date:	2009-11-15 01:38:57 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper incorporates the relative performance contract as inMiller and Pazgal (2001, 2005) and examines the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market. Contrary to Toshimitsu and Jinji (2007), it demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three-stage game of quality-delegation-quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high-quality and low-quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high-quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low-quality firm.
Relation:	South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 77:4, December 2009
Appears in Collections:	[金融管理系] 期刊論文

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