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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/5649


    Title: Equivalence of Competition Mode in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Delegation: a note
    Authors: 王雅津(Ya-Chin Wang)
    Leonard F.S. Wang
    Keywords: Relative performance contract
    equivalence outcome
    delegation games
    quality competition
    Date: 2009-12
    Issue Date: 2009-11-15 01:38:57 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper incorporates the relative performance contract as inMiller and Pazgal (2001, 2005) and
    examines the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market.
    Contrary to Toshimitsu and Jinji (2007), it demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and
    social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition,
    in a three-stage game of quality-delegation-quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation
    coefficient is different between high-quality and low-quality firms in an asymmetric vertical
    differentiated model, and a high-quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low-quality
    firm.
    Relation: South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 77:4, December 2009
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 期刊論文

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