On the Timing Choice of Managerial Incentives in Oligopolistic Environment

Kun Shan University Institutional Repository > 教學單位 > 商業管理學院 > 金融管理系 > 會議論文 > Item 987654321/4990

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/4990

Title:	On the Timing Choice of Managerial Incentives in Oligopolistic Environment
Authors:	Ya-chin Wang 王雅津
Keywords:	Managerial Incentives Multiple Leader Sequential Moves
Date:	2007
Issue Date:	2009-09-14 09:55:54 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	Dealing with managerial incentive in an oligopolistic competition market, simultaneous strategy model and sequential strategy model are considered. We show that, the leader profit would not be affected by changing the number of the follower firms when there is only one leader; when the number of firms between leader and follower become more equally distributed, it will result in lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare. Furthermore, if there are many managerial firms already delegating in advance, the rest of the firms will choose to be delegation-follower firms rather than remain entrepreneurial ones.
Appears in Collections:	[金融管理系] 會議論文

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
國際研討會-C1502.pdf		3803Kb	Adobe PDF	195	View/Open