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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/4990

    Title: On the Timing Choice of Managerial Incentives in Oligopolistic Environment
    Authors: Ya-chin Wang
    Keywords: Managerial Incentives
    Multiple Leader
    Sequential Moves
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2009-09-14 09:55:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Dealing with managerial incentive in an oligopolistic competition market, simultaneous strategy model and sequential
    strategy model are considered. We show that, the leader profit would not be affected by changing the number of the follower
    firms when there is only one leader; when the number of firms between leader and follower become more equally distributed, it
    will result in lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare. Furthermore, if there are many managerial
    firms already delegating in advance, the rest of the firms will choose to be delegation-follower firms rather than remain
    entrepreneurial ones.
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 會議論文

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