English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 26778/27374 (98%)
Visitors : 13866317      Online Users : 457
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version

    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/4988

    Title: Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy
    Authors: Leonard F. S. Wang
    Ya-Chin Wang
    Lihong Zhao
    Keywords: market share delegation
    sales delegation
    asymmetric cost
    export subsidy
    import tariff
    Date: 2007-09-04
    Issue Date: 2009-09-14 09:48:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Strategic delegation analysis has been limited to sales delegation cases, until
    Jansen et al. (International Journal of Industrial Organization 25:531–539, 2007) presented
    the case of market share delegation. In international trade theory, export rivalry and import
    protection have always attracted considerable attention. This paper assesses the influence
    upon optimal trade policy of introducing market share delegation in a trade duopoly
    context. It shows that delegation matters, and different forms of delegation coupled with
    asymmetric costs will imply different degrees of government intervention.
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    market share delegation and strategic trade policy(期刊).pdf141KbAdobe PDF134View/Open

    All items in KSUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    ©Kun Shan University Library and Information Center
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback