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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ksu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/3194


    Title: Privatization, Optimal Tariffs and Welfare in an International Mixed Oligopoly
    Authors: WangYa-Chin
    WangLeonard F.S.
    ZhaoLihong
    Keywords: Privatization
    Mixed Oligopoly
    Leader-Follower
    Endogenous Timing
    Date: 2008-12-15
    Issue Date: 2009-08-13 23:30:12 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper examines when the government imposes an import tariff, the decision onwhether to privatize the public firm in an international mixed oligopoly, in whichfirms decide their output levels sequentially or simultaneously. The privatization of apublic firm unambiguously increases the optimal tariff. Using an extended gameconsisting of government’s preplay stage, firms’ preplay stage and basic stage, it isshown that the government chooses not to privatize the public firm and tends to openthe market for foreign entry. In this equilibrium, the natural order of the game isdomestic leadership.
    Appears in Collections:[金融管理系] 會議論文

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