Strategic Import Tariffs, Managerial Delegation, and Social Welfare in a Quality Differentiated Market

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Title:	Strategic Import Tariffs, Managerial Delegation, and Social Welfare in a Quality Differentiated Market
Authors:	王雅津
Date:	2011-07-14
Issue Date:	2012-09-11 15:27:29 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper explores motivations for an importing country imposing discriminatory or uniform tariffs on quality differentiated imports. The purpose is to examine how the import policy and quality choice respond to managerial incentive in turn. In comparison to free trade, both interventions increase average quality and consumer surplus by a greater amount than the decrease in tariff revenues; accordingly, it increases the domestic welfare. The highest welfare is obtained by practicing a discriminatory tariff, where a high-quality firm pays zero-tariff and a low-quality firm gets quality subsidy. This result brings meaningful support to the WTO initiative for tariff elimination.
Relation:	The Global Business & Finance Research Conference, 英國, 2011.7.14
Appears in Collections:	[金融管理系] 會議論文

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